Rather than being constrained by the least ambitious governments, the European Union (EU) has until recently set the pace of national environmental policy. The contribution examines why the EU was often able to set the pace despite the institutionalist expectation that national diversity and quasi-unanimity should produce joint-decision traps. It also explains why this is no longer the case. Adopting a long-term, diachronic perspective, I argue that the EU's unexpected dynamism and its recent decline are related to distinct institutional exits from the joint-decision trap that have opened and closed in different periods. During the emergence of the policy area, diversity was manageable through bargaining, and joint gains were abundant.
Yet rather than representing member states' lowest common denominator, the EU propels their environmental policy forward (Holzinger, Knill, & Sommerer, 2008, p. 578; Tosun, 2013, p. 182) .
Since the 1970s, European environmental policy quickly emerged from a by-product of economic integration into a full-blown, independent policy area. European environmental law covered ever more issues and reached high levels of protection. The Council adopted more than 600 pieces of environmental law between 1970 and 2013, exceeding one act every month. Although the EU is not a state, it "has some of the most progressive policies of any state in the world" (Jordan & Adelle, 2013, p. 1) .
There is thus a theory-practice gap: Despite the EU's well-known institutional rigidity, its environmental policy turned out remarkably dynamic. True, the environment is still degrading at an alarming rate; but at least the EU evaded joint-decision traps (JDTs) and belied the law of the least ambitious program. My first aim is to shed light on this puzzle. I adopt a long-term perspective, drawing on existing case studies in addition to original research and quantitative data on legislative activity. The long haul reveals that the EU's green dynamism has been declining since the mid-2000s. My second aim is to understand this "rise and fall" through the lens of the JDT. The direction of inquiry is exploratory. I survey and complement existing research on five decades of EU environmental politics to develop hypotheses that explain the theory-practice gap. I do not, however, purport to submit these hypotheses to a rigorous test.
The argument of this paper is that, until recently, the JDT has shaped the politics more than the policies. That is to say, the remarkable emergence and expansion of EU environmental policy is owed to "exit mechanisms" (Falkner, 2011) or "subterfuge strategies" (Héritier, 1999 ) that helped policy making to escape or avoid JDTs. Different exit mechanisms have emerged and disappeared over time, often in conjunction with institutional reform. Since the Eastern enlargement, the escape routes have narrowed and the JDT is returning.
Section 2 spells out the concept of the JDT and its exits. Section 3 shows how environmental policy was strongly limited by the JDT at first. It could be overcome only where interests converged or were made convergent through package deals. The emergence of a European environmental policy owes much to the fact that the potential for joint gains was still unexploited. This phase was followed by two decades of expansion and consolidation, examined in Section 4.
Environmental policy relied on new exits, mostly in the form of supranational intervention. As a result, it became highly dynamic and no longer tied to market concerns. Section 5 argues that this dynamism started to decline after the turn of the millennium, leading to a period of (forced) flexibility. Enlargement made bargaining cumbersome, supranational exits became weaker, but more decisions are now made in the nonpolitical regulatory mode.
| DECISION TRAPS AND THEIR EXITS
The JDT model is based on "two simple and powerful conditions" (Scharpf, 1988, p. 245) : (a) central-level decisions depend directly on the agreement of lower level governments and (b) central-level decisions require a supermajority. Under these conditions, which apply for the raft of environmental legislation, decisions should tend to minimal compromises and deadlock, whenever governmental interests are in conflict. Thus, given heterogeneous preferences, the JDT places a strong constraint on policy change. However, the JDT model applies better to the intergovernmental mode of governance and to the community method than to the regulatory mode:
• In the intergovernmental mode, decisions are made by national governments, through negotiations, and mostly on the summit level of the heads of state and government. The involvement of supranational actors is minimal, and governments remain in full control as veto players. Agreements are thus limited to solutions that are Pareto superior to the status quo. Intergovernmental negotiations were the dominant mode of environmental rule making throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Scharpf, 2001, p. 8) .
• Under the community method, environmental policy depends on a formal proposal of the European Commission, a majority in the European Parliament (EP) and a qualified majority in the Council.
Policy decisions are not determined by intergovernmental agreement alone, but a divided Council can still lead into deadlock. Over time, the distribution of power within this institutional triangle has changed, as has the extent to which environmental policy was covered by the community method, which dominates environmental policy since the late 1980s (Scharpf, 2001, p. 12 ).
• In the regulatory mode, decisions are taken at arm's length from the Council by networks of national and supranational experts. Agencies as well as implementing and delegated acts by the Commission are examples. Environmental rule making in the regulatory mode is largely decoupled from national governments and influenced more by expert consensus and sectoral constituencies than by intergovernmental bargaining. The regulatory mode has increased in importance since the 2000s, although the major decisions are still made using the community method (Wallace & Reh, 2015, p. 99) .
National governments are most central in the intergovernmental mode, less in the community method, and least in the regulatory mode. In the same order, environmental policy decisions are mediated more by third actors and by dynamics other than bargaining. Each mode thereby provides different exits from the JDT (Falkner, 2011) .
• Bargaining exits include the distribution of bargaining power (a) and strategies to achieve consensus under unanimity (b). (a) Environmental policy decisions in the intergovernmental mode depend on the distribution of bargaining power between environmental frontrunners and latecomers. Conventionally, bargaining power is understood as a function of each actor's alternatives to agreement (Moravcsik, 1993) . These are strongly linked to the leeway for domestic regulation. For example, if a member state can threaten to unilaterally regulate imported products, it may push for strict common rules as alternative (Scharpf, 1999, pp. 96-96) . (b) Strategies to DETERSachieve consensus may leave the level of protection intact, which is often true for side payments and package deals, or they rely on finding the lowest common denominator, which is true for opt-outs and watering down (Holzinger, 2011, pp. 122-123) .
• Interventions by supranational actors have often facilitated high levels of ambition. The European Commission and the EP tend to promote more stringent policies than the average member state, inter alia because they can form a position by majority vote and promote regulation as a means of integration (Majone, 1996, p. 74) .
The Commission also acts as a gatekeeper for new policy initiatives.
Because member states seek to minimize implementation costs, the green states have actively sought the support of the Commission to promote national blueprints for European legislation (Börzel, 2003) .
Whereas the Commission's influence has receded, that of the EP has only increased (Burns, Carter, & Worsfold, 2012 ).
• Decision rules other than unanimity are another exit mechanism that became available partly as a result of judicial intervention and partly due to treaty reform. Qualified majority voting (QMV) has freed environmental policy decisions from deadlock. Before codecision became ordinary, the existence of multiple legislative rules made it possible to play the "treaty base game" (Rhodes, 1995) , that is, to select the most "change-friendly" institutional rules. Similarly, the delegation of environmental policy to the Commission and to transnational expert committees serves as exit from the JDT, to the extent that public controversy is replaced by technocratic consensus (Deters, 2018) . 
| EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Covering five decades, the following sections must portrait the development of EU environmental policy in broad strokes. I review literature from all periods and combine this with original research. My empirical focus is mostly on emissions from automobiles and stationary sources, because this covers contentious issues in which the JDT is most likely to arise, as well as both product and process regulations.
These cases are prominent and well researched, which improves the validity of the findings. Looking at similar issues at different points in time allows me to generate hypotheses about the causal role of changes in the institutional environment. A rigorous test of these hypotheses is a matter for future research. In assessing the EU's dynamism, I use the amount of legislative activity as a quantitative approximation, and the stringency of legislation in relation to the demands of high-and low-regulating member states as qualitative benchmark.
| THE EMERGENCE OF EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1973-1987)
The origin of European environmental policy is conventionally defined as the adoption of the EU's first Environmental Action Programme in 1973 (e.g., Knill & Liefferink, 2013, p. 13) . In these early years, an intergovernmental logic dominated environmental policy making.
Decision traps were likely, and legislation often reflected the lowest common denominator of member state interests, namely, creating markets and managing externalities.
| Few exits …
The first constraint was the lack of a legal basis. The founding treaties did "not expressly permit Community institutions to act in the field of environmental protection" (Rehbinder & Stewart, 1988, p. 15) The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) encouraged this practice by maintaining that environmental protection was implied in the "accelerated raising of the standard of living" that the preamble and Article 2 of the EEC treaty define as a goal of the EU. Attempts by individual governments to block environmental policy making by challenging the EU's competence were thus thwarted. The CJEU had opened an exit from a systemic JDT by obviating the need to establish an environment title through treaty reform (McCormick, 2001, p. 42; Rehbinder & Stewart, 1988, p. 21 ).
The second constraint was the rigidity of decision making.
Formally, the treaty provided for widespread use of QMV as early as 1969, but the "Luxembourg compromise" practically delayed the transition until 1987 (Garrett & Tsebelis, 1996 ; but see Golub, 1999, pp. 259-268) . Under the consultation procedure, the EP had only a right to issue nonbinding opinions. Council decision making was confined to intergovernmental bargaining under unanimity, and the potential for supranational intervention was tightly circumscribed.
At the end of the decade, the Isoglucose ruling 2 afforded the EP the power to delay unwelcome decisions (Rehbinder & Stewart, 1988, p. 268 to convince the Council to take EP positions on board (Judge, Earnshaw, & Cowan, 1994, p. 266) , but formally, all power resided with the Council.
Because decision making was restricted to intergovernmental bargaining, the distribution of power between member states determined protection levels. In this regard, the CJEU was again crucial.
Compared with its rulings on institutional questions, the Court was much more conservative on the substantive balance between trade and environment. The 1974 Dassonville ruling 3 prohibited national measures that potentially restricted the free movement of goods. In (1979) , the Court ruled that national measures could only be upheld if, inter alia, they protected "mandatory requirements." 4 This jurisprudence discouraged member states from introducing domestic environmental provisions that affected foreign products. Compromises in the form of European legislation had thus to be sought.
Cassis
As the Court tended to strike down national measures, the green states were in a weak bargaining position (Holzinger, 2011, p. 121) .
| … but many common denominators
Neither the need to secure unanimous agreement nor the lack of formal treaty powers preempted the emergence of a common environmental policy. However, the JDT confined it to the zone of common interests, and decisions were shaped by the distribution of bargaining power in the Council, which was skewed toward the reluctant governments.
The reason why environmental policy took shape already in the 1970s was the abundance of "low-hanging fruit." Functional necessities like the working of the single market created needs for coordination, whereas diverse policy legacies posed no obstacle yet. Moreover, this was also the time of emerging environmental movements and green parties on the national level (Weale et al., 2000, p. 246) , as a result of which certain countries began to take on the role of environmental pioneers.
One, if not the most, important common concern was to ensure the functioning of the single market (Weale, 2005) . Directive 67/548 on the classification, packaging, and labeling of chemical substances is a case in point. The directive, often cited as the first piece of environmental regulation, was adopted as "harmonization" measure based on Article 114 TFEU. Vehicle emissions are another example.
Directive 70/220 responded to German and French attempts to set national standards that threatened to fragment the market (Rehbinder & Stewart, 1988, p. 17) . "Optional minimum harmonization" for environmental product standards was typical in this period, highlighting their market rationale (Weale et al., 2000, pp. 32-33) .
Nonetheless, early EU environmental policy was not limited to ensuring smooth trade. Member states also had partly convergent interests in managing externalities, as combating transboundary pollution required coordination. Waldsterben in Germany as well as the acidification of Scandinavian lakes came to be seen as caused by air pollution, in particular by sulfuric dioxide from cars as well as from stationary sources in various countries (Boehmer-Christiansen & Skea, 1991) . With its direct effect and supremacy, EU law seemed the right tool to overcome the problem of free riding in the protection of common pool resources (Keohane & Ostrom, 1994) . The serious implementation deficits became apparent only much later (Knill & Liefferink, 2007, p. 146 ).
In addition to product regulation, the EU therefore introduced ambient air quality standards, but these only reflected the lowest common denominator (Hey, 2005, p. 19) . Moreover, stationary sources were not regulated before the mid-1980s (Zito, 2000, p. 62) .
In The so-called Seveso directives are examples of both externalities and spillover from trade. They were adopted in response to the eponymous industrial accident after which drums of hazardous waste thought to contain dioxin went missing in Italy and resurfaced in
France. Environmental policy in this period was often "hot-spot management" responding to incidents (Hey, 2005, p. 18) , which in the case of Seveso were also successfully politicized by the EP (McCormick, 2001, p. 53) . Member states' interests thereby converged due to the issue's salience and urgency.
In terms of legislative activity, environmental legislation took off after the adoption of the first Environmental Action Programme (see Table 1 and Figure 1 ). Between 1970 and the entering into force of the Single European Act, the EU adopted 210 pieces of environmental legislation, amounting to 0.82 acts per month. Although far from deadlock, this is the smallest legislative activity of all periods.
| EXPANSION AND CONSOLIDATION (1987-2004)
The period of expansion began with the Single European Act (SEA) and ended with Eastern enlargement. Environmental policy making moved from the intergovernmental mode to the community method. Novel exits from the JDT arose from a dedicated treaty basis, new environmental policy initiatives as opportunities to advance integration, they promoted more and stricter legislation than the Council (Majone, 1996, p. 74) . The cooperation procedure strengthened the Commission's agenda-setting power. Because the Council could now adopt a commission proposal by QMV but amend it only by unanimity, the Commission could target a majority coalition sympathetic to its own goals (Tsebelis & Garrett, 2000, p. 18) . Cooperation also introduced a second reading, in which Parliament could amend the council position if supported by the Commission, giving it "conditional agenda-setting power" (Tsebelis, 1994) .
The existence of at least two treaty provisions for environmental policy allowed the Commission to play the "treaty base game" (Rhodes, 1995, p. 99) . The Commission preferred harmonization to the new environment title, because it activated QMV, involved the environmentally conscious EP, and banned the introduction of stricter national measures (Holzinger, 2011, p. 119 (Gehring, 1997, p. 347) .
The Court had thus opened up a bargaining exit. The ruling was partly institutionalized in the SEA at the insistence of Denmark and Sweden as "environmental guarantee" (Liefferink & Andersen, 1998, p. 258) .
Now laid down in Article 114 (4-6) TFEU, the guarantee allows derogations from "approximated" laws that do not constitute "an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market" (Article 114 [6] TFEU) under narrow conditions and subject to approval by the Commission (de Sadeleer, 2014, pp. 358-377).
| Bargaining exits
This new bargaining exit strengthened environmental legislation.
Building on Danish Bottles, the Court ruled in 1992 that a Belgian waste import restriction was justified as protecting a mandatory requirement. 8 As a result, the Council adopted a regulation (259/93) on the transborder shipment of waste, which expressly allowed national waste import bans (Wheeler, 1993, p. 95) . The 1991 German packaging ordinance is another example. It required companies to take back packaging waste or pay to handle the collection. Foreign companies operating in Germany lodged complaints with the Commission.
The latter refrained from taking the matter to Court, partly due to the risk of legal defeat under the new case law. Again, the domestic scheme therefore prompted EU legislation. The resulting directive (94/62/EEC) exceeded the conservative positions, although this time, it fell behind the aspirations of the most ambitious governments (Gehring, 1997, pp. 350-351; Weale et al., 2000, pp. 419-424) .
Legislation on car emissions illustrates the point further.
In 
| Supranational intervention
The judge-made bargaining exit facilitated harmonization of product standards on a high level of protection. European production standards, however, could still be defeated by the less ambitious member states (Scharpf, 1999, p. 97) . Nevertheless, the EU also adopted its first major production regulations in this phase. The Commission, however, used it as blueprint for the draft directive.
Later on, the Commission's role was largely reduced to mediation, but the stringent, technology-based German approach was maintained (Héritier, Knill, & Mingers, 1996) .
In the early 90s, the United Kingdom played the role of pacesetter and succeeded in pushing elements of its innovative Environmental Protection Act onto the agenda. For example, the Commission proposal on the Directive on the Free Access to Environmental Information (90/313/EEC) "was essentially written by an expert from the British Environment Ministry" (Knill & Liefferink, 2007, p. 113) .
Because the Commission acted as gatekeeper for European policy proposals, member states competed to be heard by the Commission in order to promote their preferred concepts. The environmental pioneers with their high adaptation costs and readily available blueprints dominated the competition (Börzel, 2003; Héritier et al., 1996) . Inversely, the rapid expansion suggests that policies were indeed bottled up in the first period, indicating a strong effect of the JDT during these years. Maastricht emphasized the subsidiarity principle. Although already part of the SEA, it was now more often referred to. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany prepared national "hit lists" for EU policies (Collier, 1997, p. 10) , which may partly explain the sudden drop in legislative activity in the first half of the 90s (see Figure 1 ).
| Consolidating the green acquis
For the first time, the Commission started to withdraw environmental policy proposals, explicitly referring to subsidiarity (Golub, 1996, pp. 699-700). Ten initiatives were removed from the agenda between 1991 and 1995. 11 Substantively, environmental policy turned to less intrusive instruments built around self-regulation, access to information, and incentives (Holzinger, 2011, p. 112; Knill & Liefferink, 2007, p. 19) . The Commission's readiness to cave in to member states' reluctance and place subsidiarity over sustainability (another Maastricht goal) can be interpreted as a result of its weaker agendasetting power under codecision.
The plummeting of legislative activity in the second half of this phase was only short lived. It was "a sign of consolidation rather than deterioration" (Lenschow & Sprungk, 2010, p. 139) . After the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, more environmental legislation was produced than ever before. With the newcomers, the green states now had a blocking minority that increased their bargaining power in the "shadow of the vote" (Liefferink & Andersen, 1998, p. 260) .
However, the peak in legislation before the Eastern enlargement is also consistent with member states "gearing up the legislative process" (Leuffen & Hertz, 2010, p. 69) in anticipation of more difficult decision-making postaccession.
| FLEXIBILITY OR ROLLBACK?
The 2004 Eastern enlargement marks the beginning of the current phase, in which we observe a revival of the JDT. Supranational exits are waning, whereas bargaining exits are becoming insufficient to cope with increased diversity. As a result, legislation has slowed down, 9 The LCP Directive and the Small Cars Directive were eventually linked. France and the United Kingdom were ready to accept the stringent German compromise proposal on LCP in return for Germany accepting a more lenient car emission standard (Holzinger, 1994, p. 308; Zito, 2000, p. 64).
10 Spain, Portugal, and Ireland opposed the concomitant extension of QMV, fearing more stringent EU policies and higher implementation costs. They agreed in exchange for side payments in the form of the newly established cohesion fund (Börzel, 2002: 205-206) .
11 Own calculation based on Eur-Lex.
and policy is becoming less ambitious, leaving more room for derogation and flexibility. In the area of clean air and water protection, "the EU has entered a four-year period of almost complete regulatory inactivity after the year 2010" (Steinebach & Knill, 2017, p. 430) .
Ever since the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, legislative output has fallen almost to the level of the 1980s (see Figure 1 ). Whereas environmental policy has resisted dismantling, "the policy area is increasingly characterized by stasis, calling into question Europe's famed environmental leadership" (Burns, Tobin, & Sewerin, 2018, p. 199) . At the same time, however, more decisions have been adopted in the regulatory mode, outside of political lawmaking and contestation (see Figure 2 ).
The Treaties of Nice (in force since 2003) and Lisbon (2009) reformed voting in the Council to make the EU fit for enlargement.
Nice introduced a triple-majority rule, which Lisbon replaced by today's double-majority rule (55% of the countries representing 65% of the population). It was widely expected that the accession of 12 new member states with weak environmental policies and a need to catch up economically would hamper the EU's environmental decision making (Holzinger & Knoepfel, 2000; Vandeveer & Carmin, 2004) .
Empirical tests of these expectations on a small number of cases during the first years after enlargement came to a more optimistic conclusion and emphasized issue-specific differences (e.g., Skjaerseth & Wettestad, 2007) . Thanks to conditionality, the transposition of the existing green acquis in the accession countries was above average (Braun, 2014, chapter 4) . The new member states also exercised restraint in legislative bargaining; they did not yet form a permanent veto coalition opposed to ambitious environmental policy across the board (Skjaerseth & Wettestad, 2007) , perhaps because the newcomers perceived the first new environmental policies as "extension of their accession criteria" (Braun, 2014, p. 152) .
But more recent studies suggest that the new member states have started to flex their muscles. Clearly, the Council has not ground to a halt, but decision-making scholars now find an impact of enlargement in terms of polarization, voting coalitions (Mattila, 2009; Thomson, 2011, pp. 64-66) , legislative output (Toshkov, 2017, p. 182) , and decision-making speed (Hertz & Leuffen, 2011) . 12 These impacts are visible only on some issues and in some policy areas. Environmental policy is one of them (Toshkov, 2017, p. 189) .
| Waning supranational intervention
Increased conflict and diversity compounded the JDT and weakened its exits. This pertains first to supranational intervention. The year following enlargement, the Commission renewed its "Better Regulation" initiative with a focus on deregulation (Radaelli, 2007) . In the aftermath of the 2008 financial and economic crisis, the Commission moreover came under attack from business and member states for the alleged burden imposed by environmental regulation (Steinebach & Knill, 2017, p. 433) . As a result, it launched a "Regulatory Fitness Also, the EP is no longer an obvious environmental champion.
Although a majority opposed the withdrawal of the Air Quality Package, the plenary failed to agree on the wording for a resolution.
Codecision empowered an EP that has become less green. Burns et al. (2012) , examining EP amendments to environmental legislation 12 Using descriptive statistics, in contrast to Leuffen's (2011) survival analysis, Best and Settembri (2008) found that enlargement accelerated law production. Table 2 ).
| Narrow bargaining exits
With supranational intervention waning, environmental politics has to rely on bargaining exits. Unfortunately, bargaining is now more cumbersome, as more latecomers than before need to be compen- at the instigation of the Visegrád group, the decision had to be unanimous (Jankowska, 2011, p. 171) . Moreover, the revenues generated from emission allowance auctioning could be used as side payments in the form of subsidies for climate projects (Skjaerseth, Eikeland, Gulbrandsen, & Jevnaker, 2016) . In spite of this, the less enthusiastic central and Eastern European countries were able to extract major concessions (Bocquillon & Maltby, 2017, p. 94) .
In addition to increased heterogeneity, the recent sluggishness may also be caused by decreasing ambition on the part of former pioneer countries, which, like the waning activism of the Commission, coincides with the economic recession in the wake of the Euro crisis (Burns et al., 2018 
| Decision rules
With supranational interventions waning and bargaining exits becoming narrower, more environmental policy is now created using the regulatory mode. In 2002, Tsebelis and Yataganas argued that the Nice reform and enlargement would not only empower the Council and make it "almost impossible to alter the legislative status quo" (Tsebelis & Yataganas, 2002, p. 304) , it would also lead to greater bureaucratization (p. 300, see alsoThomson, 2011, p. 192) . For example, the particulate matter count under the most recent Euro 6 norm for Diesel engines was adopted by the Commission under its executive powers.
The nonpolitical decisions adopted by the Commission at arm's length from the legislative branch have not followed the declining trend of environmental legislation, to the contrary (see Figure 2) . To be sure, bureaucratic lawmaking presupposes that secondary law, on which the Commission can base its decisions, already exists. In that sense, the regulatory mode complements rather than supersedes the joint-decision mode. 13 However, once secondary law has delegated the task of adopting regulatory decisions to the Commission, the very combination of JDT and diversity that constrains legislative lawmaking often makes it more difficult to revoke the delegation and results in more bureaucratic discretion (Tsebelis & Yataganas, 2002, p. 300) .
| The need for flexibility
In addition to making more use of the regulatory mode, the EU has responded to the difficult political decision making with flexible and potentially weaker policies, including framework directives, marketbased, and voluntary instruments. "The practice of delegating discretionary powers to national authorities to resolve controversy has increased since the 2004 enlargement" (Thomson, 2011, p. 254 ; see also Wurzel, 2012, p. 230) , confirming the "need for flexibility" that was expected at "the brink of eastern enlargement" (Holzinger & Knoepfel, 2000) . Already the Sixth Environmental Action Programme (2002-2012) was more cautious than its predecessors. It stuck to general objectives and frameworks that were subsequently fleshed out in so-called thematic strategies, which are essentially "frameworks to further frameworks" (Hey, 2005, p. 27) . Costly and potentially controversial decisions were postponed. For example, EU emission trading began with a long pilot phase with free emission allowances, and even after the 2009 reforms, most costs "will not unfold their full effect in the next 15 years" (Müller & Slominski, 2013 , p. 1436 .
Starting with the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC), EU environmental policy adopted a "mandated participatory planning" (MPP) approach (Newig & Koontz, 2014) , in which directives specify very broad overall goals (such as "good water quality") and procedures for adopting measures on the national level, giving member states substantial flexibility (see also Blühdorn & Deflorian, 2019) . In contrast to traditional framework directives, in which the substantive targets were defined in subsequent "daughter directives" adopted on the EU level, the MPP approach leaves the target specification to the member state, but even the MPP approach does not prevent deadlock, as evinced by the 7 years of negotiations and eventual withdrawal in 2013 of the soil framework directive proposal (Deters, 2019) .
| CONCLUSION
The remarkable evolution of EU environmental policy to one of the EU's most successful policy areas is puzzling, given the heterogeneity and number of veto players on whose agreement policy change depends. This setting creates a risk of joint-decision traps. But the EU's changing institutions also provide different opportunities, at different times, to escape or avoid deadlock, shaping the dynamics more than the outcomes of environmental politics.
This article explored the impact of institutional change on these dynamics and outcomes. In the first phase, environmental policy was made in the mode of intergovernmental negotiation. Only bargaining exits were available, and the JDT was therefore a powerful constraint.
However, abundant low-hanging fruit and single-market spillovers left much room for agreement. In the second phase, the community method added supranational exits, as the EP and Commission could intervene into or catalyze intergovernmental decisions. The CJEU moreover improved the bargaining position of pioneer states whose number also increased in the Northern enlargement. In the current phase, environmental policy is increasingly complemented by decisions made in the regulatory mode. However, political legislation has become more cumbersome and prone to JDTs after the Eastern enlargement and as indirect result of the economic crisis. Bargaining must cope with more diversity, and supranational interventions are less powerful. As the constraint of the JDT is again increasing, the legislative output is sliding back to 1980s levels and is becoming more flexible.
Spanning five decades of coevolution of institutions and the policy area, the analysis had to paint in broad strokes. It generated a number of hypotheses as to how environmental politics escapes the JDT; these could be picked up with theory-testing designs to estimate the various exit mechanisms' relative contributions to environmental policy change, as well as the precise impact of increased postenlargement heterogeneity. Future research could moreover attempt to disentangle the impacts of enlargement and economic crisis, which are temporally overlapping, on the EU's decreasing green dynamism in general and on the declining activism of the Commission in particular. Most pertinent contributions examine the impact on the level of former accession countries (e.g., Andonova & VanDeveer, 2012 ) rather than on the EU level (but see Bocquillon & Maltby, 2017) . Finally, the move from intergovernmental negotiation to the community method and eventually to the regulatory mode is not limited to environmental policy, which opens room for comparison with the evolution of politics and policies in other areas.
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